Sheikh Ahmad al-Rashîd
There are two important terms in the science of Islamic legal theory that cause people no end of confusion. They are the legislative cause (`illah) for Islamic legal rulings and the wisdom (hikmah) behind those rulings. Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence investigate these two terms at length in many of their writings, usually when discussing juristic analogy (qiyâs) and how legislation can be derived in consideration of the general welfare.
There is a considerable degree of overlap in meaning between these two terms, and this is what causes confusion for some people. How to properly define the difference between the “legislative causes” for Islamic rulings and the “wisdom” behind them is one of the difficult topics that Islamic theorists have labored upon and argued about. In this article, we shall attempt to define and clarify the difference between these two concepts in the clearest possible manner, and in doing so, we shall highlight some of the unique aspects of each.
Scholars have suggested a number of technical definitions for the “legislative cause”. The most well-known of these is: “A visible and consistent attribute by which an Islamic legal ruling is known.”
Take, for example, the famous ruling that the thief’s hand is to be cut off. This is the prescribed punishment set by Allah for the thief. What is the legislative cause for this ruling? It is theft. Theft fulfills the conditions for a legislative cause that we set forth in our definition above. Theft is an attribute that is visible. People can easily identify it and distinguish it. It is not obscure to anyone. Theft is also an attribute that possesses consistency in its meaning. It can be clearly defined and delineated. It is not a subjective concept that varies from person to person of from place to place. It is also the attribute by which the Islamic ruling is known, meaning that whenever an act of theft takes place, we know that the ruling of cutting the thief’s hand is to be applied. (This is, of course, contingent on the fulfillment of all the conditions for the ruling to be carried out and the absence of any legal preventatives.)
As for the wisdom behind an Islamic legal ruling, it can be defined as: “the benefits that are realized or the harm that is prevented by virtue of that ruling being legislated.” Allah prescribed the ruling for us either for the sake of securing for us some benefit or for the sake of protecting us from some harm.
Returning to our example of the punishment for theft, we can see that the wisdom behind its legislation is to protect and safeguard people’s property.
From this, it should be clear to us that the wisdom behind an Islamic legal ruling is the objective that the ruling is intended to achieve. As for the legislative cause, it is the visible and consistent attribute upon which Allah has established the ruling, so that the ruling exists when its cause is present and the ruling does not exist when its cause is not present. The cause is intrinsically tied in with the ruling in this way, because this is how the wisdom behind the ruling is achieved. In our example, the wisdom behind carrying out the prescribed punishment upon the thief, which is the protection of people’s wealth, is achieved by having the punishment apply in the event of theft and not apply in the absence of theft.
The relationship between the wisdom behind a ruling and its legislative cause has a consequence on our ability to know what the wisdom behind a particular ruling is. Our knowledge of Allah’s wisdom behind His ruling is based upon our knowing its legislative cause. If we know and understand the legislative cause for the ruling, we can ascertain the wisdom behind it. If we are unable to discern or understand that cause, we will not be able to know the wisdom behind the ruling.
Islamic rulings can be divided with respect to their legislative causes into two categories:
1. Rulings whose causes are understandable to the human intellect. These rulings include the prohibition of wine and the legitimacy of judicially administered retribution. It is possible for us to ascertain the wisdom behind such rulings.
2. Rulings whose causes are incomprehensible to the human intellect. These rulings still have causes; however our minds cannot fathom them. Scholars refer to such rulings as “rulings of pure devotion”. These include such rulings as the number of units of prayer that we pray in each of our five daily prayers, our kissing the black stone during pilgrimage, and our wiping upon the tops of our socks instead of the bottoms. Since we cannot fathom the causes for such rulings, it is impossible for us to ascertain the wisdom behind them. We are still required to believe in these rulings and accept on faith that they were prescribed for us for some wisdom that is unknown to us.
We should also point out that in the terminology of Islamic jurisprudence, causes are of two types:
1. Legislative causes that we have already defined. These causes are used by scholars in the exercise of juristic analogy (qiyâs).
For example, imbibing wine is prohibited by Islamic Law. The cause for its prohibition is its ability to intoxicate. Whenever this cause is present, the ruling of prohibition will be present as well. For this reason, we can know by way of analogy that all intoxicating drugs are unlawful, and not just wine.
2. Final causes: These are the ultimate objectives for which Allah has prescribed a certain rulings. Such causes, in fact, are synonymous with the wisdom behind the rulings.
For example, Allah has permitted us to shorten our prayers when we are traveling. The ruling here is that it is permissible for us to shorten our prayers. The legislative cause for this ruling is travel. Whenever we are traveling the ruling applies, and when we are not traveling the ruling does not apply. The final cause – the wisdom – for this ruling is the consideration of the difficulties people face when traveling.
Returning to our example of the prohibition of wine, the ruling here is one of prohibition. The legislative cause for this ruling is intoxication, so that whenever something intoxicates it will be prohibited by Islamic Law. The final cause – the wisdom – for this ruling is the preservation of the human mind from what brings it harm and ruination.
There are rulings whose legislative causes might be somewhat obscure to us, but that nevertheless can still be ascertained. Scholars exercise their judgment in an attempt to understand these reasons. We can look at, for example, the ruling that it is obligatory to perform wudû’ after eating camel meat.
Most scholars would consider the ruling that eating camel meat nullifies our wudû’ to be a purely devotional ruling whose legislative cause cannot be fathomed and whose wisdom cannot be ascertained. Some scholars, however, have tried to determine the legislative cause for this ruling, Ibn al-Qayyim among them. He points out that camel meat has an effect on the person who eats it due to the peculiar temperament of the camel. The Prophet (peace be upon him) describes this temperament as being one of pride and conceit. [refer to Sahîh al-Bukhârî (3301) and Sahîh Muslim (52)]
Ibn al-Qayyim argues that this effect on the person who eats camel meat has the strength of a legislative cause with reference to his need to perform wudû’ afterwards. The wisdom behind this ruling is for a person to keep away from harshness in his personality and to remain upon the good and gentle nature that a Muslim is supposed to have.
Attempting to deduce the legislative causes for Islamic legal rulings and the wisdom behind them is an important activity for the Muslim legal scholar which falls under the broad auspices of juristic reasoning (ijtihâd). Deriving knowledge of the causes and wisdom behind Islamic rulings not only has a marked affect on how these rulings are put into practice, it is a way for us to acquire knowledge about the broad objectives of Islamic Law. Such knowledge is extremely important, so much so that some scholars consider possession of it a prerequisite for engaging in juristic reasoning.
